We build a mathematical structure in which we can ask questions about the methods for achieving security properties, such as confidentiality and integrity, and functionality properties, such as safety and liveness. The structure allows us to consider many different choices for the meaning of "confidentiality" and "integrity" and so on, and to compare and contrast security properties with functionality properties.
Introduction

A foundation for security?
What is a foundation for studying security? The answer: a mathematical structure in which we can model our real-world concerns about security and in which we can ask and answer interesting questions about those real-world concerns.
The nature of the structure is affected by the questions one wishes to ask. In this paper we wish to ask questions about method: How can we define a particular security property and then find a system that has it? How do the methods for achieving security properties and functionality properties inter-relate? The last question we consider so fundamental that we name theorems on this topic basic theorems. To avoid confusion with an earlier use of this term by Bell and La Padula [1] we will avoid the name basic security theorem for the theorems presented in this paper and use instead basic confidentiality theorem, and so on. These theorems place security in its context in the world of formal software engineering, and so the structure presented in this paper must necessarily be large enough to capture both traditional concerns as well as those of security.
Part of the intention of this paper is to challenge the notion of what a "basic security theorem" should be. There is a certain similarity of intent behind Bell and La Padula's theorem and the theorems of this paper as both address the issues of valid methods. However, there is a vast difference in approach and scope. Bell and La Padula address a particular instance of a proof technique-showing that a certain predicate on the state is invariant under all operations-while this paper addresses the limits on any method for achieving confidentiality, integrity and so on. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pass further comment on the meaning or utility of Bell and La Padula's result; interested readers are referred to the comments of McLean [27] and Bell [2] .
The nature of a foundation
To make it usable, a mathematical model must be as simple as possible. Not too simple, of course, but any unnecessary complexity compounds the job of investigating the structure. This is particularly true in computing where we need to deal with systems measured in millions of transistors or lines of code or nodes on a network. When the objects with which we have to deal are so complex we cannot afford any unnecessary complication in the theory which we use to reason about them. By being abstract enough the essential structure is revealed and fundamental theorems become very obvious and easy to prove.
We deal with complexity by separating concerns. A good-and security relevantexample of this approach is Goguen and Meseguer's unwinding theorem for noninterference, connecting a simple external characterisation of a property with the internal structure of a system [9, 10] . The overall structure is quite complex, but the factorisation helps us to understand it.
A major separation of concerns in this paper is the separation of what from how. This paper proposes a definition of what confidentiality and integrity properties are, and it does so without saying how to attain them. The paper does address limitations on heuristics for building secure systems. An important limitation, the Basic Confidentiality Theorem and its corollaries , is that the high-level heuristic "Use any of the standard methods of functional refinement" may fail for confidentiality. Not being constrained to give constructive definitions allows us the liberty of simpler, shorter and clearer definitions. (To build secure systems that meet these definitions heuristics are needed. Each heuristic must stand up to the test of the general definition. The construction of a useful set of heuristics is a topic for further research.)
Something else which does not concern us, and which we factor out, is the level of detail at which we consider a system. We only insist that a system is something that can be interacted with.
Formal Software Engineering Methods
The sorts of methods we are interested in are those known as formal methods. In these a system is seen as a mathematical object about which we can reason. A customer who wishes to purchase a system captures his desires as a formal specification, which is also a mathematical object. An implementor has an obligation to show that any system proposed as fulfilling the contract meets the specification. This obligation is just theorem proving in the way mathematicians are used to. The difference between ordinary mathematics and the formal methods approach to computing is the size of the expressions involved.
There are various ways of discharging the proof obligation. Most common is verification, where a system is proposed and a proof of correctness is carried out. This is usually done through a series of design steps, each step being shown to implement the previous one. Recently there has been much interest in calculating implementations. This includes, for example, Morgan's work on sequential programming (see for example [29, 30] ) and the Bird-Meertens Formalism (see for example [3] ). Here each step of the development guarantees correctness, and the consequences of a design decision may be calculated.
The proof obligation gives a semantics to a specification language. The viewpoint of this paper is that different properties are defined by different proof obligations.
Properties and pre-orders
We are going to follow the framework proposed by Jacob [21] . This explains how properties such as safety, liveness, confidentiality and integrity can be captured by a relation which expresses at-least-as-good-as (or, equivalently, no-worse-than) for that property. These relations are just pre-orders (see Appendix B) over the set of all possible implementations.
Another way to look at pre-orders over implementations is as an abstraction of a set of verification conditions. By comparing pre-orders we obtain many interesting facts about the relationships between different kinds of property.
We will write the set of all possible implementations
(This name is introduced formally, according to the conventions of Z: see Subsection 1.6 and Appendix A.)
Structure of the paper
Functionality properties are discussed in section 2. In sections 3 and 4 we build up structures which are candidates for the titles 'confidentiality' and 'integrity' and show how they relate to functionality. Finally, we briefly discuss denial of service, in section 5. Appendix B introduces in a formal manner some of the mathematical apparatus we need to build up the main structures of the paper.
Notation
This paper is a formal one, as befits a paper on formal methods. As such the paper is complete, and all the mathematical definitions used to build the main structures are given in full (any definitions not in this paper will be found in [41] ). Note that some of the examples, however, are not presented formally.
We need to choose a concrete syntax for the mathematics, and pick that of Z [41] . The Z notation is a concrete syntax for presenting typed set theory in which predicates are always defined but other terms may not be. It is a notation currently growing in popularity and is finding its way into standards, including those of the security community (see, for example, [7, Paragraph 108] and [6] ). Z is due for standardisation by the British Standards Institute in 1992 or 1993.
A brief guide to the parts of Z used in this paper is given in Appendix A. Anyone unfamiliar with Z should familiarise themselves with the notation for sets, which is not standard, and with the notion of a schema.
Functionality
Levels of detail
To describe functionality properties we define a preorder. In fact we will define a family of preorders, which describe functionality at different levels of detail. In this we follow Olderog and Hoare's proposals [35] for Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [16] . Some of the models for CSP are due to others, for example the failures model is due to Brooks, Hoare and Roscoe [4] and the timed models are due to Reed and Roscoe [37, 38] . We will break each preorder into a semantic function and a partial order.
The level of detail is captured by a semantic function which gives the set of interactions which can be made with an implementation.
[Interaction]
interactions : Implementation → P Interaction When the interactions are finite traces of synchronisation events we can reason about safety properties; when failures, about nondeterminism and deadlock; when timed traces, about real-time safety properties and so on. A similar family of models exists for sequential programs. Standard denotational semantics models a program (or, more properly, a statement) as a function from states to states. Such a function is just a set of input/output pairs, each of which represents a possible interaction with the program's environment [42] .
Unstructured environments
The usual symbol to represent better functionality is . The relation is defined:
: Preorder Implementation
A better implementation is one with fewer interactions. Let m and m be two machines such that m m . A user will never be surprised by m when expecting m .
(The problem of being surprised by an implementation refusing to do something is solved by using a model at least as detailed as the failures model.) Many texts deal with specifying and achieving functionality properties, for example [5, 8, 13, 16, 24, 25, 29] . Papers from a series of workshops on refinement may be found in [26, 31, 32] .
Structured environments
The preorder is appropriate when nothing is known about the environment, but it is too strong otherwise. Because security issues (of the sort we deal with in this paper) only arise in shared systems, we should consider functional refinement with respect to environments which are structured as many users.
An implementation m can be replaced by another m when no single user can tell the difference. m may allow different relative timings from m as long as there are no more interactions for each user. Such preorders are discussed in [20] , where two different preorders are discussed, cooperating refinement and independent refinement. Cooperating refinement is stronger than independent refinement but weaker than . Cooperating refinement allows for different users cooperating on a task; independent refinement assumes that no two users are working on the same task or wish to share data.
Here we explain only cooperating refinement. Each global interaction in Interaction is composed of many parts, one for each user interface to the implementation. A user interface, which we will call a window, is identified with the set of atomic interactions it can make with an implementation. We introduce a set of all atomic interactions and identify users, or windows, with subsets of it.
[Atom]
Exactly what an atom is will vary from case to case, and may be at a variety of levels of detail.
Example 1 Some possibilities for atoms are:
• User Janet calling procedure sine with argument 0.987.
• User Janet receiving an answer of 0.234 following an invocation of the sine procedure.
• User SecurityOfficer setting the classification of file ProjectNames to Restricted.
While a window can be any set of atoms, it will typically be the set of all of the atoms which refer to a single user. For example, the set of all atoms which mention actions directly involving the user SecurityOfficer will be an important window in many analyses of systems. Now we can introduce a restriction operator that extracts each user's part. We suppose that there is a special interaction which represents no computation, ε.
ε : Interaction filt E x is the view of x as seen by the user whose window is E.
Example 2 If we take interactions to be sets of atomic events, 
filt E t = t E
If we take interactions to be failures (see [16] for a discussion of failures and how they are used to model nondeterminism), Interaction = seq Atom × P Atom then the axioms are satisfied by
and
filt E (t, r) = (t E, r ∩ E)
To define cooperating refinement we need a semantic function, rel. 1 The function takes a set of windows and an implementation and forms the set of consistent window-indexed tuples of the implementation.
The function rel throws away information about each interaction. It preserves the information about each window's projection of the interaction, but not information as to how these projections fit together. Figure 1 gives an example where rel has 1 As a (slight) abuse of the Z notation we will write the argument to rel as a subscript. That is, we will write rel A rather than rel A. We take the same liberty with some of the other functions below.
been applied to a buffer. The figure is explained in more detail below (Example 6). One system has better cooperating functionality than another when each interaction of the better system can be broken up into its projections and re-assembled into an interaction of the worse system.
The basic theorem of cooperating functional refinement states that it is sufficient to produce an ordinary refinement,
, to obtain a cooperating refinement.
Theorem 1 (Basic Theorem of Cooperating Functionality)
Proof Let m and n be implementations:
The implication follows by the monotonicity of functional image with respect to subset; the equivalences follow from the various definitions.
Ordinary functional refinement is not, however, necessary for cooperating functional refinement. A useful theorem about cooperating functionality says that if we are interested in more windows then fewer implementations are a refinement of a given implementation.
Theorem 3
Proof Follows by monotonicity of projection.
Theorem 3 justifies the extension of theorems below, which refer to CoopF A for a particular A, to versions which refer to supersets of A.
Confidentiality
The work in this section is adapted from [17, 18, 19] . The material reported in [17] is a detailed working through of [18] in the traces model of CSP [15] . Here we are as abstract as possible.
What is confidentiality?
Again we are concerned with shared systems. Confidentiality is about limiting how much one user can infer about another user's interaction with the system by making an interaction with the system themselves. Examples of confidentiality properties are:
Example 3 User John cannot know anything about user Janet's interaction from an interaction of his own.
Example 4
John can only know the contents of messages received by Janet if they were sent by a user in the coal-powered group.
Example 5 John can only know the actions of Janet for which security officer or Janet has currently given permission.
These examples do not define confidentiality, nor even capture the full range of confidentiality properties. They are just intended to aid intuition.
Measuring Confidentiality
The function infer measures how much can be discovered through one window about the interaction at another window. 2 It is the semantic function we need to build a confidentiality ordering.
The predicate filt A = says that is a an interaction of A exclusively.) The set infer A B m is the set of all interactions of B consistent with • A's interaction , and
• the system m.
Thus infer A B is a function which measures how much A can discover about B by making the interaction .
Another way of expressing infer, useful later, is
In [18] different types of security breaches are classified by the way the set Interaction is instantiated, for example:
Transput leaks are flows analysable by taking as observations traces of inputs and the outputs from each trace.
Synchronisation leaks are flows analysable by taking observations to be traces of adirectional events [15] . The appendix to [18] contains a program which has synchronisation leaks but not transput leaks.
Deadlock leaks are flows analysable by considering not only traces but what each user was trying to do when the system crashes. This uses the failures model [4] .
Timing leaks are flows analysable by considering the time at which events occur and are offered. The timed observations developed for CSP are examples of possible observations to analyse this category.
This list is by no means complete. In any given application the developers may choose Interaction to be anything that is appropriate. The choice of Interaction will probably depend on a risk analysis. John McLean has pointed out that theories such as the one discussed in this section are really theories of information sharing [28] . When we choose to work with interactions which encode a temporal ordering (such as traces or failures), the function infer A B measures how much information about B's past is shared by A and B.
The point that this is a theory of information sharing can be made by pictures. We give one example of a picture here, others can be found in [23] . Figure 1 shows part of the behaviour of a one bit wide, single place buffer, which we shall call Buff . Bullets, "•" indicate pairs of consistent observations. The first two possible inputs (by In) and the first two possible outputs (to Out) are shown. A first output of a 0 is only consistent with a first input of a 0 and then either no or one further input. An input of two items is consistent with 1, 1 Figure 1 : Part of the behaviour of a buffer the output of one or two items, but not with none or with three or more. More formally, we can read off:
Example 6
• 1, 0 • 0, 1 • Out 0, 0 • 1 • • • 0 • • • • • • 0 1 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0 1, 1 Ininfer Out In 0 Buff = { 0 , 0, 0 , 0, 1 } infer In Out 0, 1 Buff = { 0 , 0, 1 }
Comparing confidentiality
Once we can measure, we can compare:
One implementation, m, is better than another, n, with respect to knowledge gained by A about B when making interaction , if less knowledge may be gained through m than n. 'Less knowledge' translates to more uncertainty, and hence superset, or inverse of subset, ( ⊆ ) ∼ , appears in the definition. Usually we will want to say an implementation is no worse than another if it is no worse for all observations. The family of preorders ConfK A B says just this.
In addition we will often want to say that one implementation must be an improvement with respect to several ordered pairs of windows. This can be constructed as the intersection of several copies of ConfK A B . The details are left to the reader. We can interpret both cooperating refinement and confidentiality refinement in terms of the pictures such as that of 1 (Example 6). Recall that each bullet represents a non-empty equivalence class of global interactions. Now,
Global functional refinement,
, allows removal of interactions. So some bullets can disappear, and none may appear.
Cooperating functional refinement, CoopF A , like global functional refinement, allows bullets to be removed, but not added to the picture. Whereas we were only allowed to delete global interactions, we are now allowed to add global interactions too. The interactions which may be added must not be distinguishable, by local information alone, from interactions already there; that is, they must belong to an already populated equivalence class.
Confidentiality refinement, ConfK A B , unlike the previous two relations, allows more bullets to be added to the picture and forbids removal of bullets. This corresponds to adding any global interaction but only deleting global interactions where a representative of the equivalence class remains behind. When considering ConfKL A B this applies to one row or column of the picture only.
Example 7 Consider two systems m and n that serve two users A and B. The internal state of the two systems is the same: a single register, initialised to zero. Suppose that only A can write to the register in both m and n, and for simplicity only, cannot read from the register in either case. B is allowed to both write to and read from both systems; a random number is generated for each read of m, while the value in the register is output by n.
If we take interactions to be sequences of reads and write to the register, we have, for m, that no interaction of B gains it any information about A; that is no sequence of writes by A can be ruled out, including the empty sequence. The picture (in the style of Figure 1 ) for m is a solid rectangle: it contains a bullet in every position. The system m satisfies Rushby's criterion of separability [39] . However, for n, an interaction by B that contains no writes and a read of a value other than zero tells B that A has written that value at least once; the interaction may contain more information about other writes by A as well. The picture for n contains 'holes', in particular for the row representing the null interaction by A. Hence n has worse confidentiality than m.
The preceding discussion informally states and justifies several important theorems about the relationship between functionality and confidentiality. Among these we have that cooperating functional refinement and confidentiality refinement are opposites.
Theorem 4 (Basic Confidentiality Theorem)
Cooperating functionality and confidentiality are inversely related: increasing (decreasing) cooperating functionality may decrease (increase) the confidentiality provided by the system on a particular observation at a particular window.
Proof Let m and n be implementations, A and B be windows onto m and n, and be an interaction through window A. We have:
The implication follows from the monotonicity of projections with respect to subset. The second equivalence follows from lemma 1, while the other equivalences follow from the various definitions.
Theorem 4 should not be too surprising. To increase functionality, more certainty about the system's behaviour is given to the environment. Less certainty by one user about other (higher security level) users' actions leads to more confidentiality.
There are some corollaries of Theorem 4 which are important enough to call theorems. An immediate corollary to Theorem 5 is a result about the symmetry of information sharing. Theorem 6 does not say that the flows from A to B are equal to the flows from B to A. While flows in both directions must increase or decrease together they can change by different amounts. Theorem 6 extends a theorem on the symmetry of information flow first shown by Sutherland [43] ; Sutherland showed that introducing some flow in one direction to a system with no flows also introduced flow in the opposite direction. Another immediate corollary of Theorem 5 is the relationship between unstructured functionality and confidentiality.
Theorem 5 Increasing (decreasing) cooperating functionality may decrease (in-
crease
Theorem 6 Increasing (decreasing) the inferences one window may make about another increases (decreases) the inferences the latter can make about the former.
Theorem 7 Increasing (decreasing) functionality may decrease (increase) confidentiality.
Proof Let A and B be windows. Then by Theorems 1 and 5 we have
An important corollary gives us the condition for maintaining functionality and confidentiality together.
Theorem 8 Cooperating functionality and confidentiality are preserved together if, and only if, each window's view is unaltered by refinement.
Proof Let A and B be windows onto implementations m and n. From Theorem 5 and the definition of CoopF {A,B} we have
From the definition of CoopF {A,B} we have
The result follows by the conjunction of these two facts.
The intersection of the two preorders gives an equivalence relation. This says that, while it is possible to move between various implementations, it is not possible to increase either the cooperating functionality or the confidentiality properties. One implementation within an equivalence class may be preferred to another for unformalised reasons, such as cost, or country of manufacture, and so on. Graham-Cumming and Sanders give a result related to Theorem 8 in the setting of data refinement by downward simulation [11] . The normal rules for downward simulation just guarantee a data refinement that enforces . GrahamCumming and Sanders give sufficient, but not necessary, restrictions on a downwards simulation for it to guarantee ConfK A B too.
Discussion
The import of Theorems 4-8 is that just applying traditional development methods can introduce insecurities. Consider, for example, a method that says:
1. Choose a security policy.
2. Formalise the policy.
3. Find a (formal) top level design which satisfies the (formalised) policy. 4 . Implement the top level design.
"Implement the design" traditionally means that only functionality is to be enforced (that is, the proof obligation is the one encoded by ). In this case unwanted data paths (often called covert channels) can be introduced into the implementation. There is no guarantee that covert channels will be introduced, just no guarantee that they are not introduced 3 . It does not matter whether "implement the design" is achieved by taking a series of small design decisions, each of which guarantees (or CoopF A ), or if the final code is produced informally and then verified against (or CoopF A ) in one large step. Consider a system to which user A can write, and from which user B can read random numbers. Nothing user A writes changes the state of the system (as far as B is concerned), and so there is no information flow from A to B. A correct refinement (in the sense of ) of this system is one where A's latest input is stored in a register and the output to B is constrained to be the value in this register. There is now scope for large flows from A to B. The refinement has all the functionality properties of the original system, but has lost some of the confidentiality properties.
Thus programs can be "proved correct" and still contain errors because the wrong theorem has been proved. No verification software (or method) which encodes (or similar) without also encoding ConfK A B (or similar) will catch such an error. There is the risk that the 'certificate of correctness' produced by such a method will lead to a higher level of trust in an implementation than it deserves.
There is also a higher-level risk. The formal approach to software development will be seen to have failed, when it was merely used in the wrong way. This could lead to the removal of a powerful tool from the hands of the software engineer.
Information-theoretic notions of confidentiality
The theory of confidentiality discussed above is based on the quality of inferences that can be made by one user about another. A different approach is to use Shannon's Information Theory (see, for example, [44] for an introduction to this theory). Several authors have recently sought to base their work in security on information theory (see, for example, [12, 33, 45] ).
The ideas above may be applied to an information-theoretic notion of confidentiality. Let capacity A B be the function which measures the capacity of a channel from window A to window B. The relation which represents improving confidentiality says bandwidth must decrease:
capacity A B ⊕ ( ≤ ) Information-theoretic functionality is about increasing throughput, with refinement relation given by:
Hence there is an analogue of Theorem 5 for information-theoretic confidentiality and functionality.
Theorem 9 Increasing (decreasing) the capacity of a channel worsens (improves) its security properties.
There has been some debate in the foundations community as to which of these two approaches, qualitative or quantitative, is better. As the two approaches are solutions to different problems, it is not possible to describe one as better than the other. The qualitative measure applies to whole systems where the users are assumed to be trying to protect their secrets; users will almost always be people. The quantitative measure applies to components of systems, when nothing can be assumed about the users of the component; the users will almost always be (unanalysed) code.
Integrity
The work in this section is adapted from [22] .
What is integrity?
Informally, by integrity we mean ensuring that data are altered only in an approved fashion. The ways of altering data that may be approved or forbidden are many. For example, we can forbid certain users to make any changes to the data. We can forbid certain changes to the data by any user. We can make arbitrary combinations of these. Here are some examples of integrity properties, informally expressed.
Example 8
Only user Janet may update register R.
Example 9
Both Janet and John may append characters to file F, but John is restricted to adding less than 50 characters in a row without permission.
Example 10
User Janet may update register R at any time to any value. Any other user may update R only if its contents are even, and the update may only be to a power of two.
Measuring integrity
We measure integrity as the set of exceptions to an expectation. A (group of) user(s) has an expectation of a behaviour of part of a system. We model an expectation by a window and a set of allowed interactions through that window.
Expectation window : Window inters : P Interaction ∀ : inters • filt window = Example 11 Consider a variable. It is expected that a value read from the variable is the last value written. We can formally describe an expectation of a variable of type X, taking interactions to be sequences of atomic events. The atomic events are either reads or writes of data of type X. In notation borrowed from [16] , we represent the event of a read from the variable of the value x by read.x and the event of a write to the variable of value x by write.x. Two windows are:
We also require an auxiliary function that determines the value of the latest write in a trace:
Now we can define the expected behaviour of a variable:
[Note that the characteristic predicate of inters rules out sequences where there is a read not preceded by a write. In this case lw s is undefined, unlike x which is defined, and so lw s = x is false.]
Further examples are given in [22] . A (group of) user(s) whose window includes window will be disappointed if they make an interaction whose window component is not in inters. We call such interactions exceptions.
Example 12 Consider a machine, S, whose interface consists of the unions of the sets R and W (see example 11) and also the set
The action insert.x represents a user writing x to the system. If the system ignores communications on the channel insert then there are no exceptions to VAR (see example 11)
Now consider a second system, T, with the same interface as S, but which treats inserts exactly like writes, updating the value of the variable. 
Comparing integrity
We consider one implementation better than another, with respect to a given expectation, if it has fewer exceptions. We capture this in the usual way.
Integrity : Expectation → Preorder Implementation
The Basic Integrity Theorem says that cooperating functionality is sufficient to achieve integrity with respect to any expectation.
Theorem 10 (Basic Integrity Theorem)
Proof Let m and n be implementations. Let W = E.window and I = E.inters. We have:
The equivalences follow from the various definitions. The implication follows from the monotonicity of set difference with respect to subset.
As a corollary of this and Theorem 1 we have that ordinary functional refinement guarantees to preserve integrity:
The import of Theorems 10 and 11 is that, unlike confidentiality, we can merge any integrity properties with functionality properties and use standard techniques to derive or verify integrity properties of implementations.
Denial of Service
Lastly we sketch some of the issues in formalising denial of service.
We can formalise the notion of denial of service by a preorder which says that one implementation is better than another if it responds to a given request in a given state more quickly. There is a subtlety here: should we consider the maximum response time, or the probability distribution of response times.
Example 13
Implementation m always responds to a read request by Janet within 0.05 seconds; while n is only guaranteed to respond within 5 minutes. However, n responds within 0.01 seconds 99 per cent of the time, whereas m always takes at least 0.03 seconds.
Depending on what a customer wants each of m and n may be considered strictly better than the other.
There are, doubtless, other measures of response time that can be taken into account.
Note that neither of these measures are preserved by .
Example 14
Let m respond to a read by Janet between 0.1 and 0.2 seconds, and n respond with a time between 0.3 and 0.4 seconds. m is better than n by both measures, but m and n have incomparable functionality properties, in the sense of . (Note that we must use a version of interactions which gives timed interactions for this to make sense).
Some denial of service properties do fit into the mold of functionality.
Example 15
In the timed failures model it is possible to formalise statements about no denial of service in exactly the same way as functionality. For example, "If the system is observed for twenty seconds after a request was made, then either the request is seen to be serviced or there will be a period of at least ten seconds when the system offers the service to the requester" (there is no obligation on the requester to take up the option of an offered service).
Conclusions
We have seen how to formalise different classes of property as preorders which express at least as good as for that property. These preorders contain fundamental information about development methods that preserve the properties they capture.
When preorders conflict, as with confidentiality and functionality, development will of necessity be harder. When preorders respect each other, as with integrity and functionality, the developer's task is easier.
Because our analysis is shorn of unnecessary detail, such as model of computation, we can be sure that the results of this paper, as well as being easily proved, apply to all circumstances.
A Notation
We have chosen to present the mathematics in this paper within the framework of Z (pronounced "zed") [41] . This is because of the availability of tools for checking the mathematics, in particular a syntax-and type-checker [40] . An introduction to Z is given in [36] . Several examples of the use of Z are given in [14] .
Z is a notation for presenting strongly typed set theory in which predicates are always defined, but other terms may not be (for example, the application of a partial function outside of its range). It enjoys many features for specifying sequential systems in a model-based style which we do not take advantage of in this paper. Most of the notation should be obvious except perhaps for the syntax for set comprehension. The syntax is Thus, the set of squares of the first ten natural numbers may be written { n : N | n < 10 • n 2 } and cannot be written { n 2 | n ∈ N ∧ n < 10 }. When there is only one variable in the declaration and the term consists of just the variable, the term may be dropped. Thus the set of natural numbers less than 10, { n : N | n < 10 • n } can be written {n : N | n < 10 }. Similarly, if the predicate is true it may be dropped. The set of all squares of natural numbers { n : N | true • n 2 } can be written { n : N • n 2 }. The term {n : N} is an abbreviation for {n : N | true • n}, which is equivalent to N.
The empty set may be written either ∅ or {}. The usual operators of intersection ∩ , union ∪ and set difference \ are available.
Functions may be defined by lambda expressions. The syntax is:
Where the declaration introduces the formal parameters with their types, the predicate can impose further conditions on the parameters and the term describes the result. Some of the other notation used in this paper is given in figure 2 . The function space constructors, → and →, are right associative, for example:
Function application is left associative, for example:
When R is a relation-valued expression we use:
to mean a is related to b by relation R.
Relations are modelled as sets of pairs. All of the set theoretic operators can be used to construct and compare relations. Functions are treated as special cases of relations. All of the operators on relations can be used for functions.
If a relation name begins and ends with an underscore, r say, then the name 'r' can be used as an infix relation symbol. A similar rule applies for function names when the domain type is a Cartesian product.
The syntax
introduces a new primitive type, T. T comes supplied only with an equality predicate.
seq X
The set of all finite sequences over X. 
Declarations
Predicate is used to introduce new global objects. A declaration consists of a name and a (possibly constrained) type separated by a colon. The predicate constrains the value of the object. When the predicate is just true it is omitted and the syntax is
Generic global objects are introduced using the notation
[Generic Parameters] Declarations Predicate
The generic parameters may only be place holders for types. The predicates must completely capture the objects being defined, up to instantiation with actual types. A global object may be introduced with the syntax Name == Term Its value and type are given by the term on the right-hand side. A similar syntax can be used for generic objects:
Name Parameter == Term Again, the parameter is a place holder for a type.
The most characteristic part of the Z notation is the schema. Schemas are used to structure the presentation of the mathematics. A schema can be thought of in two different ways. It may be thought of either as a record type construction or as a naming of the pattern There is a calculus of schemas, and in certain contexts a schema expression is allowed where a schema reference is allowed. Roughly, if ⊗ is an operator of propositional logic, then S ⊗ T is schema whose declarations are mergedcommon names must have the same base type-and whose predicates are joined by ⊗. The inclusion of a schema in the definition of another includes its declarations and conjoins its predicate to any predicates in the new definition. A schema name may be decorated, either by superscript primes or subscript digits. A decorated schema is a copy of an undecorated one, but with each declared name replaced by an appropriately decorated name.
B Mathematical preliminaries
As preorders are important to this paper, we will formally define them. A preorder is a reflexive and transitive relation; we capture this in a schema:
[This schema should be read: "A preorder over A, rel say, is a relation over A with the two properties of reflexivity and transitivity."] Note This author prefers the style that avoids quantifiers by encapsulating them in higher level notions. The predicate which describes reflexivity, id A ⊆ ( rel ), can be translated using quantifiers as: The set of all preorders over a set A is defined:
[The right-hand side describes a set with term rel which is constrained by the schema PREORDER [A] .] When a preorder is anti-symmetric it is called a partial order.
PARTIAL ORDER [A] PREORDER[A]
id A = ( rel ) ∩ ( rel ) ∼
